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The Syrian Uprising of March 2011 inter-
rupted the deepening of an amicable rela-
tionship between Turkey and Syria. After the
Cold War, Turkey’s Kemalist identity that en-
joined distance from the Arab Middle East
began to give way to a ‘neo-Ottoman’ iden-
tity, especially under the Justice and Deve-
lopment Party (AKP), which came to power
in 2000. The AKP adopted a ‘zero problems’
policy with its neighbours, meant to facilitate
the growing exports of the Anatolian Tigers
and legitimised as a project to export a ‘li-
beral peace’ to its neighbourhood.
Syria became the showcase of this strategy.
In the 1990s Turkey and Syria had been
embroiled in protracted conflict over Syria’s
support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) insurgency against Turkey, an at-
tempt by Damascus to gain leverage over
Turkey’s control of the Euphrates’ water dis-
tribution at Syria’s expense, with the roots
of enmity going back to Syria’s historic re-
jection of Turkey’s annexation of Iskande-
run/Hatay. Yet, in the 2000s, the two states
turned trans-state interdependencies that
had previously been sources of conflict into
occasions of growing co-operation, in which
borders were de-securitised, joint river
water management initiated and trade and
investment rapidly developed. Turkish dis-
course spoke of brothers artificially separa-
ted by the break up of the Ottoman Empire
and of an ambition to create a security com-
munity between the two states. The two sta-
tes aligned, together with Iran, in a regional
‘Trilateral bloc’ against the common threat
from Kurdish irredentism and the destabili-
sation of Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. It
is therefore all the more remarkable that in
2011 Turkey-Syria relations deteriorated so
rapidly and so thoroughly; in a few short
months after the outbreak of the Syrian
Uprising, amity had turned into enmity.1
I. Explaining the move to enmity
I.1 Negative tit for tat
Since Turkey was the main initiator of the
deterioration in relations, an explanation re-
quires understanding the Syria policy of the
ruling AKP. The AKP was initially loath to
see Asad fall, since Syria had become the
showcase of its policy of engagement with
the Arab World. Yet, the 2011 Syrian Upri-
sing precipitated an escalating negative tit
for tat between the two states at the lea-
dership level. Then Prime Minister Erdoğan
called on his ‘friends’ in Syria to implement
far-reaching political reforms rather than re-
pressing protestors and urged Asad to
share power with the Muslim Brothers.
When this advice was not taken, he took
umbrage; the tone from Ankara became
more hectoring and the reaction from Da-
mascus more resentful. Asad claimed in
interviews with the Turkish press that Syri-
a’s relation with Turkey had always been
marred by Erdoğan’s advocacy of the inclu-
sion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria’s
political process. 
As the level of Syrian government violence
against protestors increased and refugees
from the fighting flooded into southern Tur-
key, the Turkish government increased the
pressure on Asad: even as it was urging re-
forms on him, the AKP sought leverage
over him by hosting opposition leaders, no-
tably the Muslim Brotherhood, eventually
sponsoring a potential alternative govern-
1 Hinnebusch and Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations.
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ment, the Syrian National Council (SNC). In
June 2011, Turkey gave sanctuary to Syrian
army defectors and helped them constitute
themselves as the Free Syrian Army (FSA),
an anti-Damascus armed force. The Syrian
Ambasador in Ankara warned that Damas-
cus could retaliate by resuming support for
the PKK; indeed, Syria soon allowed the
PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurdish party, the
PYD, to take over much of the Kurdish in-
habited Syrian border zone with Turkey. A
pro-government Syrian newspaper also
warned Turkey it would jeopardise its eco-
nomic links to the Arab World that ran
through Syria.2 In a key meeting between
Asad and then-Turkish Foreign Minister
Davutoğlu in August 2011, the latter’s war-
nings of Western intervention if Asad did not
abandon his ‘security solution’ to the upri-
sing was met by counter threats that Syria
could, in reaction, unleash Hizbollah and a
regional war. 
Syrian-Turkish economic interdependence
proved too thin to prevent the reversal of
amity. Not only did both sides sacrifice the
benefits of cooperation but also each res-
umed the use of trans-state interdependen-
cies against the other. Turkey ended the
High Level Strategic Council that had facili-
tated cooperation over issues, such as
water and imposed economic sanctions on
Syria that, in reprisal, ended the free trade
arrangements that had favoured Turkey,
ousting Turkish investors and obstructing
Turkey’s transit links to the Gulf. The Syria-
Turkey border, which had been opened du-
ring the rapprochement, allowing dense fa-
mily and trade ties, was now re-militarised
and the border areas suffered economic los-
ses and an influx of refugees.3 Turkey colla-
borated with the Arab League in trying to get
a UN resolution against Syria. Syria’s June
2012 downing of a Turkish reconnaissance
plane was possibly a warning to Turkey that
military intervention in Syria would be costly. 
Asad and Erdoğan, formerly praised by the
media in the neighbouring countries, were
now demonised in the rival capitals: Asad
was the dictator with blood on his hands;
Erdoğan was the “Turkish-Ottoman-Wah-
habi Sectarian enemy that rules in Istan-
bul.”4 If the interaction of Asad and Erdoğan
had been crucial to generating amity in the
1990s, this very personalisation of the rela-
tion meant that when the leaders fell out
over the uprising, the deterioration of rela-
tions was exaggerated.
I.2 Identity over security?
With renewed Turkey-Syria hostility, the re-
lation of the two states was sharply resecu-
ritised and mutual threat perceptions re-
emerged. This is readily understood in
Syria’s case since Ankara’s support for the
uprising threatened regime survival. But, in
realist terms, a much weakened Syria did
not present a threat to Turkey despite se-
veral incidents, including Syria’s downing of
the Turkish aircraft and some cross border
shelling. Such minor threats hardly seem to
justify Turkey’s sacrifice of cooperation with
Syria against the PKK, traditionally seen as
the major threat to Turkey’s security. More-
over, Turkey’s support for anti-Asad insur-
gents was certain to destabilise its neigh-
bour, with no assurance that the fall of the
Asad regime would not unleash even grea-
ter turbulence in Turkey’s neighbourhood.
As such, Erdoğan’s choices seem incon-
gruent with the ‘defensive realism’ of tradi-
tional Turkish foreign policy.
Rather, Turkey’s response to the Syrian
Uprising was a function of the way the
change in Turkey’s identity under the AKP
reshaped the government’s conceptions of
Turkey’s interests and of the threats to
them. The AKP’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ ambition to
restore Turkish leadership in the Arab world,
deeply rooted in its conception of Turkey’s
2 al-Watan, various issues May, June 2011.  
3 Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations”.
4 al-Manar, 28 April 2012.
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identity, was decisive in driving Turkey’s po-
licy. Discourse by then-Prime Minister
Erdoğan and then Foreign Minister
Davutoğlu had proposed a new multinatio-
nal regional order grouping Turks, Arabs
and Kurds under an Islamic banner that
would overcome the mutilation of the region
by the post WWI settlement.5 This was initi-
ally pursued via a policy of ‘zero problems’
with neighbours that was driven less by se-
curity fears than by the ambition to export a
liberal peace to the region, largely through
economic integration. 
The outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’ presented
Turkey with a challenge to this policy, parti-
cularly after its opposition to the Western
intervention in Libya was attributed to Tur-
kish economic interests there. But the AKP
appeared to learn from the damage done to
its image that economic integration alone
could not secure its role in the region, and
its bid for regional leadership depended on
standing against repressive dictatorships.
The uprising, indeed, was also an opportu-
nity since the embrace of democratic norms
by the Arab masses allowed Ankara to pro-
mote its Islamic-compatible version of de-
mocracy as a regional model. Polls showed
that Arab opinion had come to view the Tur-
kish model with favour and Muslim Brother-
hood avatars akin to the AKP scored elec-
toral successes across the region. With the
acclaim won by Prime Minister Erdoğan in
his September 2011 visit to Egypt and Tu-
nisia, where Muslim Brotherhood govern-
ments had come to power, Turkey started
positioning itself as the big brother of the
emerging Arab democracies. This soft
power was expected to serve its bid for re-
gional hegemony.6 
As such, Turkey’s turn against Asad was ar-
guably consistent with its interests, as they
had been re-interpreted through the AKP’s
identity lens. The Syrian regime’s use of
violence against unarmed protestors would
have been seen as incompatible with the li-
beral peace Turkey wanted to export to its
neighbourhood. Once the Asad regime de-
clined Turkish advice to accommodate the
Syrian opposition, Ankara may have calcu-
lated that it had to choose between the re-
gime and its opponents, and Turkey’s de-
mocratic norms were a factor in this choice. 
The Turkish government also miscalculated
that the Asad regime could not survive long,
hence that sacrificing relations with it would
not have long-term costs, and therefore de-
cided to pro-actively sponsor a friendly op-
position that could replace it. Were the Mus-
lim Brotherhood to have come to power in
Damascus, the AKP could expect to enjoy
special influence there, crowning the status
achieved in Tunis and Cairo until mid-2013.
Once Turkey burned its bridges with Asad,
the ‘zero problems’ policy could not be res-
tored without regime change. Thus, if Syria
was the showcase of Turkey’s previous he-
gemonic formula based on economic inte-
gration, it was now the test case of the new
version based on export of democratisation. 
Nevertheless, this benign vision was soon
distorted. As Asad moved to rally his secta-
rian constituency by demonising the Syrian
opposition as Islamic terrorists and used
violence against the mostly Sunni opposi-
tion, the AKP’s discourse against Asad po-
sitioned Ankara as a defender of Sunni
Muslims; Turkey’s bid for regional hege-
mony was increasingly framed in terms of
the Sunni Islamic identity Turkey shared
with the Arab World.7 This was all the more
so as Turkey’s main competition in Syria
and for regional hegemony was Iran, at the
head of a Shia-dominated ‘resistance axis’
in which Syria was the weakest link. While
Turkey deployed its Sunni Islamist identity
instrumentally it contributed to a dangerous
sectarianisation of the region.
5 Mutfi, “Arab Reactions to Turkey’s Regional Engagement”.
6 Altunişik, “Turkey’s Soft Power”.
7 Aras, “The Syrian Uprising”.
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I.3 Power balancing and regional 
realignment
Turkey’s Syria policy was reinforced by
shifts in the regional power balance, the
context within which policy makers calculate
the threats that, in turn, shape their align-
ments. The ‘Trilateral Front’ that Turkey, Iran
and Syria had constructed against shared
threats from the US invasion of Iraq, notably
Kurdish separatism, was undermined as the
US withdrew from Iraq. Tehran geographi-
cally connected, via a friendly Shia-led Iraq,
the parts of the so-called ‘Shiite Crescent’
linking it to Syria and Hezbollah.8 To Ankara,
this threatened the balance of power in the
region. But it was the Syrian Uprising that
precipitated a reshuffle in regional align-
ments. Once the Turkish government, as
well as Saudi Arabia and the GCC, began
supporting the opposition to the Asad re-
gime, not only politically but also with arms,
funding and a safe haven in Turkey, the Sy-
rian regime became dependent on support
from Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah for its survi-
val. The debilitation of the Asad regime put
Iran on the defensive against the newly as-
sertive Sunni powers, since Asad’s fall
would sever Iran’s connection to Hizbollah
and cripple the Iran-led ‘resistance axis’ to
the advantage of the Sunni bloc led by
Saudi Arabia. The Syrian Uprising therefore
precipitated a major realignment of regional
alliances as the Trilateral Front gave way to
intense Turkish-Iranian rivalry over Syria,
and moved Ankara into cooperation with
Saudi Arabia and the GCC.9 This realign-
ment overlapped with the region-wide Shia-
Sunni cleavage, with sectarian discourse an
instrument in the inter-bloc power struggle.10
Turkey’s relations with the West were also
an element in its policy toward the Syrian
crisis. At the outset of the Syrian Uprising,
Turkey tried to demonstrate its value as a
regional interlocutor for the West, owing to
the assumed leverage over Asad that would
allow Ankara to steer him toward peaceful
political change. Turkey initially resisted
Western-proposed sanctions that would
hurt Syrian and Turkish businesses, having
experienced economic loss when the West
imposed sanctions on Iraq. Turkey was also
initially against international intervention,
except as a last resort, but were Asad to be
toppled by such intervention, as in Libya,
Turkey wanted to ensure a place at the di-
plomatic table and a say in Syria’s post-
Asad settlement. Washington, for its part,
had reverted, under Obama, to a more pru-
dent offshore balancing policy in MENA that
was more reliant on regional allies, and it
viewed Turkey as a key ally in dealing with
the Syria crisis. During his visit to New York
in September 2011, Erdoğan declared that
Turkey would coordinate sanctions against
Syria with the US and Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton declared that the US was
looking to Turkey and the Arab League to
manage regime change in Syria.11
However, once the AKP government finally
lost patience with Asad, it sought to enlist
its Western allies in regime change, even
pressing a reluctant US to intervene, in a
manner that “turned the accustomed dyna-
mics” of Turkish-American relations “upside
down”.12 Turkey not only urged the ‘interna-
tional community’ to impose sanctions on
Syria, but also proposed a no-fly zone and
a safe haven for Syrian refugees. It soon
became openly critical of the UN Security
Council for its inaction as it became clear
that Russia and China were unwilling to
allow a UN-endorsed military intervention.
When Syria downed a Turkish Air Force jet
in summer 2012, Ankara’s immediate reac-
tion was to call on NATO for support, with
8 Oktav, “The Iran-Turkey-Syria Quasi-Alliance”.
9 Altunışık, “Explaining the Transformation of Turkish-Syrian Relations”.
10 Akbaba and Özdamar, “Ethnicity, Religion and Foreign Policy”.
11 Today’s Zaman, 21 September 2011; Hürriyet 20 November 2011.
12 Aydıntaşbaş, “Kızılay’dan humus’a insani yardım koridoru”.
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Davutoğlu declaring that, “[a]ny attack
against Turkey’s borders is an attack
against NATO”.13
II. The consequences of the move to en-
mity: overreach and blowback
II.1 Turkey, Asad and Sunni Jihadism
As the Syrian Uprising turned into protrac-
ted civil war, the AKP government became
increasingly frustrated by the unexpected te-
nacity of the Asad regime and the reluctance
of the West to move against him. According
to Seymour Hersh’s intelligence sources,
Turkey and the US reached a secret agree-
ment in early 2012 for the CIA to ship arms
from Libyan arsenals into Syria. The Ameri-
can decision to end the programme, after
arms fell into jihadist hands, angered Tur-
key. In a highly disputed article, Hersh clai-
med that Turkey helped the Syrian al-Qaida
avatar, Jabhat al-Nusra, to stage a chemi-
cal weapons attack in Syria in the hope of
provoking a US response against Asad.14
Whether or not Turkey was involved,
Erdoğan was publically dissatisfied when
Russian diplomacy headed off this attack.
It soon became public knowledge that Tur-
key was helping jihadist groups in Syria, in-
cluding those linked to al-Qaida, because
they were the most effective fighters against
Asad. Turkey’s role in the creation of the Is-
lamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS, became
a major issue when the latter shocked the
world by seizing the major Iraqi city of
Mosul. In Syria, Turkey had provided ISIS
with weapons and training, allowed free
movement across its borders by jihadists,
gave them control of two critical crossing
points, permitted recruitment in Turkey, and
allowed ISIS to sell Syrian crude oil via Tur-
key, with USD 100 million estimated hidden
in Turkish banks. The AKP seemed to re-
gard ISIS as protecting Sunni interests in
Syria and Iraq against anti-Sunni regimes.
Under growing pressure from Washington,
Turkey shut down the two ISIS-controlled
border crossings, but resisted doing any-
thing more and continued its backing of two
other Syrian jihadist organisations, Jabhat
al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.15
Turkey’s support for ISIS had, however, the
unintended consequence of greatly streng-
thened the threat of Kurdish separatism,
long regarded as Turkey’s main national se-
curity threat. Earlier, in order to head off the
potential for the PKK to take advantage of
the turmoil on the Syrian border, the AKP
government had struck an alliance with the
KDP-run Kurdish regional government in
Iraq and in 2012, also entered peace nego-
tiations with the PKK. However, the PKK’s
stature among Kurds was greatly increased
in the wake of the Mosul crisis, when its
fighters rescued the beleaguered KDP
peshmerga from an ISIS attempt to pene-
trate Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. The
ISIS threat seemed to be healing the intra-
Kurdish cleavages that the AKP had been
manipulating to contain Kurdish separatism.
This explains Turkey’s refusal to allow Kur-
dish fighters to cross from Turkey to defend
the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane from an
ISIS assault: Ankara calculated that saving
the town from ISIS would strengthen the
PKK affiliated PYD that ruled Kobane, while
if the town fell, the PKK would lose prestige.
Erdoğan also tried to use the siege of Ko-
bane to force the PYD to join the opposition
against Asad as a condition for allowing re-
lief into Kobane.16
In parallel, Turkey refrained from signing the
2014 Jeddah agreement creating the anti-
ISIS coalition, using the excuse of Turkish
hostages taken by ISIS. Davutoğlu decla-
red that, as a matter of principal, Turkey
13 Sabah, 4 July 2012.
14 Seymour Hersh, “The Red Line and the Rat Line”.
15 Middle East Briefing, “Washington Worried”, Idiz, “Is the Islamic State Holding Turkey Hostage?”.
16 Cook, “Fiddling while Kobane Burns;” Zaman, “Turkey’s Leaders see Kobane as Opportunity”.
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would not become the defender of Sykes-
Picot against ISIS (referring to the British-
French border demarcation between Iraq
and Syria). Turkey was alarmed that the
anti-ISIS operation would tilt the balance of
power in favour of its regional rivals, Iran,
the Iraqi government, and, above all, the
Asad regime.17 Not only was the Western
targeting of ISIS seen as strengthening
Asad, but also Erdoğan claimed that it was
Asad’s policies that had generated ISIS and
that as long as he remained in power the ter-
rorist threat could never be effectively dealt
with.  Before ISIS, he declared, “there was
the Syrian issue and the West did nothing,
did not keep their promises. IS cannot be
solved without solving the Syrian issue”.18 
Turkey’s support for the anti-ISIS coalition
was contingent on the Syrian regime being
made a principal target. Turkey demanded
a buffer zone inside Syria for refugees pro-
tected by a no-fly zone; the real aim of the
latter was to prevent the Asad regime from
using its airpower advantage against the
armed Syrian opposition. Further, if coali-
tion airstrikes could be turned against Asad,
the Turkish sponsored opposition could ex-
pand into Asad-controlled territory. While
the West feared that destruction of the Asad
regime would open the door to jihadists
such as ISIS, Turkey believed it would bring
a friendly Sunni government to power.
While the Turkish military lacked the capa-
bility for prolonged operations inside Syria
on its own, as part of a US or NATO-led
operation, Turkish troops would be better
positioned to head off Kurdish separatist
threats, notably to prevent a cross-border
combination between the PKK and PYD.19
However, Turkey’s stand isolated it, with
Washington, Europe, Moscow and Tehran
agreeing that the priority was confronting
ISIS. US and European anger at Erdoğan’s
refusal to help prevent a feared massacre
in Kobane led them to combine to punish
Turkey by defeating its bid for a UN Security
Council seat.20
II.2 From domestic constraints to 
domestic blowback
Turkish domestic politics had no direct role
in driving the deterioration of relations with
Syria, as few Turkish actors could see gains
for their domestic standing from exploiting
it. Indeed, as Erdoğan appeared helpless to
resolve the Syrian crisis and with his ‘zero
problems’ policy in tatters, he faced increa-
sing criticism in the press, particularly as the
PYD used the situation to establish itself on
the Syrian border with Turkey. Right-wing
nationalists also attacked Erdoğan’s ‘Kur-
dish opening’ to Turkey’s Kurds, in part dri-
ven by his need to deal with the rising Sy-
rian Kurdish threat, as a national betrayal. 
The one force that benefitted from the Sy-
rian conflict was Turkey’s National Intelli-
gence Organisation (M.İ.T.) under Erdoğan
loyalist Hakan Fidan, a zealous backer of
the radical Islamist opposition in Syria.
Erdoğan’s need for his main former rival, the
traditionally Kemalist military, increased as
the security situation with Syria deteriora-
ted, leading him to seek improved relations
with the generals;21 but the military was not
noticeably keen for intervention and was an-
gered by the Kurdish opening. While
Erdoğan assumed his democratisation mis-
sion gave him a right to intervene in Syria,
the other main standard bearer of Kema-
lism, the opposition Republican People’s
Party, believed Turkey should, as Ataturk
had warned, refrain from becoming embro-
iled in the conflicts of the Middle East and
from violating the sovereignty of a neigh-
17 Taştekin, “Turkey Faces Dilemma”.
18 Candar, “Frenemies”.
19 Tol, “Turkey’s Tough Choice;” Idiz, “Asad, not Islamic State in Ankara’s crosshairs”, Idiz, “Erdoğan Confronts”,
Candar, “Frenemies”.
20 Middle East Briefing, “Joint Chiefs,” 2014.
21 Abramowitz, “Turkey’s Unending Syria Problem”.
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bouring state. For other critics, Turkey’s
rush to take sides in Syria had forfeited any
chance to act as potential mediator in the
conflict. 
As for public opinion, it was too ambivalent
and divided to be a driver of policy towards
Syria. To be sure, many Turks were infla-
med at the Syrian regime’s brutal repres-
sion of protestors and the AKP used the kil-
ling of some Turkish citizens by Syrian
cross-border shelling to elicit an overwhel-
ming parliamentary endorsement of a mili-
tary rebuff to any future incidents. Turkish
opinion did not, however, favour anything
more than strictly defensive and limited
intervention in the Syrian conflict; indeed,
the opposition of both ‘expert’ and public
opinion, even among the AKP’s consti-
tuency, to direct involvement in the conflict,
except via diplomacy, was a constraint on
Erdoğan’s options.22 Secularists and Tur-
key’s Alevi minority were alarmed at
Erdoğan’s flirtation with Sunni Islamists in
Syria and were more likely to support Asad.
Turks became increasingly alarmed at the
costs of the growing Syrian refugee pre-
sence, especially in the border provinces:
whereas in 2010 these provinces had be-
nefited from more than 2.3 million Syrian
tourists, now they hosted 1.6 million Syrian
refugees and over two-thirds of residents of
these provinces believed that Syrians’ wil-
lingness to work for lower wages was cos-
ting Turkish jobs.23 But none of this preven-
ted Erdoğan from increasing his majority in
parliament and winning a presidential elec-
tion: the costs of his policy had not resulted
in a fall in electoral support that might have
reversed the AKP’s course.
Yet, as the conflict and Turkey’s policy
drove the rise of jihadism in Syria, Turkey
experienced classic ‘blowback’ that threa-
ted its secular state, sectarian peace and
moderate democratic version of Islam. The
sectarian polarisation fostered by the Syrian
conflict jumped the border, notably in Hatay
province, where the resident Alawi Arab po-
pulation felt threatened by incoming Syrian
Sunni Islamists, and where a bombing in
the city of Reyhanlı turned opinion against
the Syrian presence. Secularists feared the
combination of the Syria crisis and AKP’s
Sunni ‘sectarian’ policy was inflaming Tur-
kish political Islamism. Indeed, in 2014, the
rise of ISIS put the long dormant issue of
the Caliphate back on the agendas of some
Turkish Islamist groups;24 interlinked with
ISIS’s own cross-border networks, Turkish
Islamist groups recruited Turks to fight in
Syria and 7-10% of ISIS militants – some
5,000 fighters – were said to be Turks.
Erdoğan’s refusal to help save Kobane from
the ISIS also angered Turkish Kurds, set-
ting off riots and a military deployment in the
southeast reminiscent of the 1990s insur-
gency, and putting the PKK-Turkish peace
talks at risk. Turks divided almost evenly
between those considering the biggest
threat to Turkey to be the PKK (44%) and
those choosing ISIS (42%).25 Erdoğan’s
Syria policy had played a major role in the
rise of both threats.
III. Conclusion
The move from amity to enmity in Turkey-
Syria relations began when mutually bene-
ficial interdependencies, growing trade and
widening cooperation unexpectedly collap-
sed under the pressure of the Syrian Upri-
sing. Turkey, reacting to the repression of
protestors by the Syrian regime, sacrificed
its alliance with Damascus to promote an
opposition counter-elite. Turkey was driven
by its ambition for regional hegemony
through export of an Islamic brand of de-
mocratisation: regime change in authorita-
rian regimes would bring kindred Islamic
22 EDAM, “Turks Give Little Support”.
23 All4Syria, “Poll Shows How Turks View Syrians”, 27 Oct 2014; Dogan, “Outsized Ambitions”.
24 Tremblay, “Turks Increasingly Sympathetic”.
25 Dalogu, “Turkey Trapped”.
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parties to power across the Arab world, in-
cluding Damascus, advancing Turkish ‘neo-
Ottoman’ hegemony in the region. Howe-
ver, in choosing to pursue a coercive export
of democratisation to Syria, the AKP helped
replicate the outcome of the American pro-
ject in Iraq – another failed state and a furt-
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the inadvertent empowerment of Kurdish ir-
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Turkey’s reach for regional hegemony en-
countered setbacks as a result of its support
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kish majorities in Arab public opinion fell
considerably, especially in Syria, where only
21% of Syrians came to believe Turkey was
a model for them.26 ‘Zero problems’ had, cri-
tics charged, changed into zero friends, le-
aving Turkey isolated. Moreover, economic
interests, the original driver of the ‘zero pro-
blems’ policy, had been sacrificed, with an-
nual losses from the severance of relations
with Syria estimated at USD 7-8 billion, and
exports to the Gulf through Syria and Iraq
paralysed by the twin crises in these states.
These outcomes are attributed by Turkish
analysts to the AKP’s “failure to grasp the
intricacies of the Syrian crisis,” or its inability
to reconcile an ‘idealist’ foreign policy with
Turkish national interests.27 The personali-
sation of relations at the highest level and
the instrumental use of sectarianism on
both sides also contributed to sub-optimal
outcomes. The limits of Turkey’s ‘zero pro-
blems’ policy and its lack of sufficient mili-
tary and economic, as well as soft power, to
manage its neighbourhood independent of
the West were sharply exposed.28 Turkey’s
regional version of ‘liberal imperialism’, like
its global US counterpart, resulted in ‘over-
reach’ and uncontrollable ‘blowback’. Yet,
far from leading to more cautious policies,
Erdoğan, driven by his “obsessive hatred
for Asad”,29 held to his project of regime
change in Syria, seeking to leverage his re-
luctant US ally into promoting the outcome
Turkey could not, by itself, realise.
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